his we must observe that love and hope differ in this, that
love denotes union between lover and beloved, while hope denotes a
movement or a stretching forth of the appetite towards an arduous
good. Now union is of things that are distinct, wherefore love can
directly regard the other whom a man unites to himself by love,
looking upon him as his other self: whereas movement is always
towards its own term which is proportionate to the subject moved.
Therefore hope regards directly one's own good, and not that which
pertains to another. Yet if we presuppose the union of love with
another, a man can hope for and desire something for another man, as
for himself; and, accordingly, he can hope for another's eternal
life, inasmuch as he is united to him by love, and just as it is the
same virtue of charity whereby a man loves God, himself, and his
neighbor, so too it is the same virtue of hope, whereby a man hopes
for himself and for another.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 17, Art. 4]

Whether a Man Can Lawfully Hope in Man?

Objection 1: It would seem that one may lawfully hope in man. For the
object of hope is eternal happiness. Now we are helped to obtain
eternal happiness by the patronage of the saints, for Gregory says
(Dial. i, 8) that "predestination is furthered by the saints'
prayers." Therefore one may hope in man.

Obj. 2: Further, if a man may not hope in another man, it ought not
to be reckoned a sin in a man, that one should not be able to hope in
him. Yet this is reckoned a vice in some, as appears from Jer. 9:4:
"Let every man take heed of his neighbor, and let him not trust in
any brother of his." Therefore it is lawful to trust in a man.

Obj. 3: Further, prayer is the expression of hope, as stated above
(A. 2, Obj. 2). But it is lawful to pray to a man for something.
Therefore it is lawful to trust in him.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Jer. 17:5): "Cursed be the man that
trusteth in man."

_I answer that,_ Hope, as stated above (A. 1; I-II, Q. 40, A. 7),
regards two things, viz. the good which it intends to obtain, and the
help by which that good is obtained. Now the good which a man hopes
to obtain, has the aspect of a final cause, while the help by which
one hopes to obtain that good, has the character of an efficient
cause. Now in each of these kinds of cause we find a principal and a
secondary cause. For the principal e