arises. Hence the
Apostle says pointedly (Heb. 6:19) that hope "enters in, even within
the veil," because that which we hope for is as yet veiled, so to
speak.

Reply Obj. 2: We ought not to pray God for any other goods, except in
reference to eternal happiness. Hence hope regards eternal happiness
chiefly, and other things, for which we pray God, it regards
secondarily and as referred to eternal happiness: just as faith
regards God principally, and, secondarily, those things which are
referred to God, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 1).

Reply Obj. 3: To him that longs for something great, all lesser
things seem small; wherefore to him that hopes for eternal happiness,
nothing else appears arduous, as compared with that hope; although,
as compared with the capability of the man who hopes, other things
besides may be arduous to him, so that he may have hope for such
things in reference to its principal object.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 17, Art. 3]

Whether One Man May Hope for Another's Eternal Happiness?

Objection 1: It would seem that one may hope for another's eternal
happiness. For the Apostle says (Phil. 1:6): "Being confident of this
very thing, that He Who hath begun a good work in you, will perfect
it unto the day of Jesus Christ." Now the perfection of that day will
be eternal happiness. Therefore one man may hope for another's
eternal happiness.

Obj. 2: Further, whatever we ask of God, we hope to obtain from Him.
But we ask God to bring others to eternal happiness, according to
James 5:16: "Pray for one another that you may be saved." Therefore
we can hope for another's eternal happiness.

Obj. 3: Further, hope and despair are about the same object. Now it
is possible to despair of another's eternal happiness, else Augustine
would have no reason for saying (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxxi) that we
should not despair of anyone so long as he lives. Therefore one can
also hope for another's eternal salvation.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Enchiridion viii) that "hope is
only of such things as belong to him who is supposed to hope for
them."

_I answer that,_ We can hope for something in two ways: first,
absolutely, and thus the object of hope is always something arduous
and pertaining to the person who hopes. Secondly, we can hope for
something, through something else being presupposed, and in this way
its object can be something pertaining to someone else. In order to
explain t