Under the first head there are eight points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether charity is friendship?
(2) Whether it is something created in the soul?
(3) Whether it is a virtue?
(4) Whether it is a special virtue?
(5) Whether it is one virtue?
(6) Whether it is the greatest of the virtues?
(7) Whether any true virtue is possible without it?
(8) Whether it is the form of the virtues?
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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 23, Art. 1]
Whether Charity Is Friendship?
Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not friendship. For
nothing is so appropriate to friendship as to dwell with one's
friend, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 5). Now charity is
of man towards God and the angels, "whose dwelling [Douay:
'conversation'] is not with men" (Dan. 2:11). Therefore charity is
not friendship.
Obj. 2: Further, there is no friendship without return of love
(Ethic. viii, 2). But charity extends even to one's enemies,
according to Matt. 5:44: "Love your enemies." Therefore charity is
not friendship.
Obj. 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 3) there
are three kinds of friendship, directed respectively towards the
delightful, the useful, or the virtuous. Now charity is not the
friendship for the useful or delightful; for Jerome says in his
letter to Paulinus which is to be found at the beginning of the
Bible: "True friendship cemented by Christ, is where men are drawn
together, not by household interests, not by mere bodily presence,
not by crafty and cajoling flattery, but by the fear of God, and the
study of the Divine Scriptures." No more is it friendship for the
virtuous, since by charity we love even sinners, whereas friendship
based on the virtuous is only for virtuous men (Ethic. viii).
Therefore charity is not friendship.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (John 15:15): "I will not now call
you servants . . . but My friends." Now this was said to them by
reason of nothing else than charity. Therefore charity is friendship.
_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 2, 3) not
every love has the character of friendship, but that love which is
together with benevolence, when, to wit, we love someone so as to
wish good to him. If, however, we do not wish good to what we love,
but wish its good for ourselves, (thus we are said to love wine, or a
horse, or the like), it is love not of friendship, but of a kind of
concupiscence. For it would be absurd
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