act
as regards the things directed to the end. Thus sick people
sometimes, though they love health much, are irregular in keeping to
their diet: and thus again, in speculative sciences, the false
opinions that are derived from the principles, do not diminish the
certitude of the principles. So too, venial sin does not merit
diminution of charity; for when a man offends in a small matter he
does not deserve to be mulcted in a great matter. For God does not
turn away from man, more than man turns away from Him: wherefore he
that is out of order in respect of things directed to the end, does
not deserve to be mulcted in charity whereby he is ordered to the
last end.

The consequence is that charity can by no means be diminished, if we
speak of direct causality, yet whatever disposes to its corruption
may be said to conduce indirectly to its diminution, and such are
venial sins, or even the cessation from the practice of works of
charity.

Reply Obj. 1: Contraries affect the same subject when that subject
stands in equal relation to both. But charity does not stand in equal
relation to increase and decrease. For it can have a cause of
increase, but not of decrease, as stated above. Hence the argument
does not prove.

Reply Obj. 2: Cupidity is twofold, one whereby man places his end in
creatures, and this kills charity altogether, since it is its poison,
as Augustine states (Confess. x). This makes us love God less (i.e.
less than we ought to love Him by charity), not indeed by diminishing
charity but by destroying it altogether. It is thus that we must
understand the saying: "He loves Thee less, who loves aught beside
Thee," for he adds these words, "which he loveth not for Thee." This
does not apply to venial sin, but only to mortal sin: since that
which we love in venial sin, is loved for God's sake habitually
though not actually. There is another cupidity, that of venial sin,
which is always diminished by charity: and yet this cupidity cannot
diminish charity, for the reason given above.

Reply Obj. 3: A movement of the free-will is requisite in the
infusion of charity, as stated above (I-II, Q. 113, A. 3). Wherefore
that which diminishes the intensity of the free-will conduces
dispositively to a diminution in the charity to be infused. On the
other hand, no movement of the free-will is required for the
safe-keeping of charity, else it would not remain in us while we
sleep. Hence charity does not decrease on accou