Cor. 6:17: "Go ye out from among them."
Therefore we should not love sinners out of charity.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 30) that
"when it is said: 'Thou shalt love thy neighbor,' it is evident that
we ought to look upon every man as our neighbor." Now sinners do not
cease to be men, for sin does not destroy nature. Therefore we ought
to love sinners out of charity.

_I answer that,_ Two things may be considered in the sinner: his
nature and his guilt. According to his nature, which he has from God,
he has a capacity for happiness, on the fellowship of which charity
is based, as stated above (A. 3; Q. 23, AA. 1, 5), wherefore we ought
to love sinners, out of charity, in respect of their nature.

On the other hand their guilt is opposed to God, and is an obstacle
to happiness. Wherefore, in respect of their guilt whereby they are
opposed to God, all sinners are to be hated, even one's father or
mother or kindred, according to Luke 12:26. For it is our duty to
hate, in the sinner, his being a sinner, and to love in him, his
being a man capable of bliss; and this is to love him truly, out of
charity, for God's sake.

Reply Obj. 1: The prophet hated the unjust, as such, and the object
of his hate was their injustice, which was their evil. Such hatred is
perfect, of which he himself says (Ps. 138:22): "I have hated them
with a perfect hatred." Now hatred of a person's evil is equivalent
to love of his good. Hence also this perfect hatred belongs to
charity.

Reply Obj. 2: As the Philosopher observes (Ethic. ix, 3), when our
friends fall into sin, we ought not to deny them the amenities of
friendship, so long as there is hope of their mending their ways, and
we ought to help them more readily to regain virtue than to recover
money, had they lost it, for as much as virtue is more akin than
money to friendship. When, however, they fall into very great
wickedness, and become incurable, we ought no longer to show them
friendliness. It is for this reason that both Divine and human laws
command such like sinners to be put to death, because there is
greater likelihood of their harming others than of their mending
their ways. Nevertheless the judge puts this into effect, not out of
hatred for the sinners, but out of the love of charity, by reason of
which he prefers the public good to the life of the individual.
Moreover the death inflicted by the judge profits the sinner, if he
be converted, unto