red, is most certainly delivered,"
as Augustine says in his book on the Predestination of the saints (De
Dono Persev. xiv).

Secondly, charity may be considered as such, and thus it is incapable
of anything that is against its nature. Wherefore charity cannot sin
at all, even as neither can heat cool, nor unrighteousness do good,
as Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 24).

Thirdly, charity can be considered on the part of its subject, which
is changeable on account of the free-will. Moreover charity may be
compared with this subject, both from the general point of view of
form in comparison with matter, and from the specific point of view
of habit as compared with power. Now it is natural for a form to be
in its subject in such a way that it can be lost, when it does not
entirely fill the potentiality of matter: this is evident in the
forms of things generated and corrupted, because the matter of such
things receives one form in such a way, that it retains the
potentiality to another form, as though its potentiality were not
completely satisfied with the one form. Hence the one form may be
lost by the other being received. On the other hand the form of a
celestial body which entirely fills the potentiality of its matter,
so that the latter does not retain the potentiality to another form,
is in its subject inseparably. Accordingly the charity of the
blessed, because it entirely fills the potentiality of the rational
mind, since every actual movement of that mind is directed to God, is
possessed by its subject inseparably: whereas the charity of the
wayfarer does not so fill the potentiality of its subject, because
the latter is not always actually directed to God: so that when it is
not actually directed to God, something may occur whereby charity is
lost.

It is proper to a habit to incline a power to act, and this belongs
to a habit, in so far as it makes whatever is suitable to it, to seem
good, and whatever is unsuitable, to seem evil. For as the taste
judges of savors according to its disposition, even so does the human
mind judge of things to be done, according to its habitual
disposition. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5) that "such as
a man is, so does the end appear to him." Accordingly charity is
inseparable from its possessor, where that which pertains to charity
cannot appear otherwise than good, and that is in heaven, where God
is seen in His Essence, which is the very essence of goodne