ued; and the lack of adverting to this has been to
some an occasion of error.

Reply Obj. 2: God is effectively the life both of the soul by
charity, and of the body by the soul: but formally charity is the
life of the soul, even as the soul is the life of the body.
Consequently we may conclude from this that just as the soul is
immediately united to the body, so is charity to the soul.

Reply Obj. 3: Charity works formally. Now the efficacy of a form
depends on the power of the agent, who instills the form, wherefore
it is evident that charity is not vanity. But because it produces an
infinite effect, since, by justifying the soul, it unites it to God,
this proves the infinity of the Divine power, which is the author of
charity.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 23, Art. 3]

Whether Charity Is a Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not a virtue. For charity
is a kind of friendship. Now philosophers do not reckon friendship a
virtue, as may be gathered from _Ethic._ viii, 1; nor is it numbered
among the virtues whether moral or intellectual. Neither, therefore,
is charity a virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, "virtue is the ultimate limit of power" (De Coelo et
Mundo i, 11). But charity is not something ultimate, this applies
rather to joy and peace. Therefore it seems that charity is not a
virtue, and that this should be said rather of joy and peace.

Obj. 3: Further, every virtue is an accidental habit. But charity is
not an accidental habit, since it is a more excellent thing than the
soul itself: whereas no accident is more excellent than its subject.
Therefore charity is not a virtue.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xi): "Charity is
a virtue which, when our affections are perfectly ordered, unites us
to God, for by it we love Him."

_I answer that,_ Human acts are good according as they are regulated
by their due rule and measure. Wherefore human virtue which is the
principle of all man's good acts consists in following the rule of
human acts, which is twofold, as stated above (Q. 17, A. 1), viz.
human reason and God.

Consequently just as moral virtue is defined as being "in accord with
right reason," as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 6, so too, the nature of
virtue consists in attaining God, as also stated above with regard to
faith, (Q. 4, A. 5) and hope (Q. 17, A. 1). Wherefore, it follows
that charity is a virtue, for, since charity attains God, it unites
us to