ue as being ordered to some particular end,
then we speak of virtue being where there is no charity, in so far as
it is directed to some particular good. But if this particular good
is not a true, but an apparent good, it is not a true virtue that is
ordered to such a good, but a counterfeit virtue. Even so, as
Augustine says (Contra Julian. iv, 3), "the prudence of the miser,
whereby he devises various roads to gain, is no true virtue; nor the
miser's justice, whereby he scorns the property of another through
fear of severe punishment; nor the miser's temperance, whereby he
curbs his desire for expensive pleasures; nor the miser's fortitude,
whereby as Horace, says, 'he braves the sea, he crosses mountains, he
goes through fire, in order to avoid poverty'" (Epis. lib, 1; Ep. i,
45). If, on the other hand, this particular good be a true good, for
instance the welfare of the state, or the like, it will indeed be a
true virtue, imperfect, however, unless it be referred to the final
and perfect good. Accordingly no strictly true virtue is possible
without charity.

Reply Obj. 1: The act of one lacking charity may be of two kinds; one
is in accordance with his lack of charity, as when he does something
that is referred to that whereby he lacks charity. Such an act is
always evil: thus Augustine says (Contra Julian. iv, 3) that the
actions which an unbeliever performs as an unbeliever, are always
sinful, even when he clothes the naked, or does any like thing, and
directs it to his unbelief as end.

There is, however, another act of one lacking charity, not in
accordance with his lack of charity, but in accordance with his
possession of some other gift of God, whether faith, or hope, or even
his natural good, which is not completely taken away by sin, as
stated above (Q. 10, A. 4; I-II, Q. 85, A. 2). In this way it is
possible for an act, without charity, to be generically good, but not
perfectly good, because it lacks its due order to the last end.

Reply Obj. 2: Since the end is in practical matters, what the
principle is in speculative matters, just as there can be no strictly
true science, if a right estimate of the first indemonstrable
principle be lacking, so, there can be no strictly true justice, or
chastity, without that due ordering to the end, which is effected by
charity, however rightly a man may be affected about other matters.

Reply Obj. 3: Science and art of their very nature imply a relation
to some par