, ought to be
distinguished from all these other fears.

Obj. 4: Further, even as servile fear fears punishment, so do initial
and worldly fear. Therefore no distinction should be made between
them.

Obj. 5: Further, even as concupiscence is about some good, so is fear
about some evil. Now "concupiscence of the eyes," which is the desire
for things of this world, is distinct from "concupiscence of the
flesh," which is the desire for one's own pleasure. Therefore
"worldly fear," whereby one fears to lose external goods, is distinct
from "human fear," whereby one fears harm to one's own person.

On the contrary stands the authority of the Master (Sent. iii, D, 34).

_I answer that,_ We are speaking of fear now, in so far as it makes
us turn, so to speak, to God or away from Him. For, since the object
of fear is an evil, sometimes, on account of the evils he fears, man
withdraws from God, and this is called human fear; while sometimes,
on account of the evils he fears, he turns to God and adheres to Him.
This latter evil is twofold, viz. evil of punishment, and evil of
fault.

Accordingly if a man turn to God and adhere to Him, through fear of
punishment, it will be servile fear; but if it be on account of fear
of committing a fault, it will be filial fear, for it becomes a child
to fear offending its father. If, however, it be on account of both,
it will be initial fear, which is between both these fears. As to
whether it is possible to fear the evil of fault, the question has
been treated above (I-II, Q. 42, A. 3) when we were considering the
passion of fear.

Reply Obj. 1: Damascene divides fear as a passion of the soul:
whereas this division of fear is taken from its relation to God, as
explained above.

Reply Obj. 2: Moral good consists chiefly in turning to God, while
moral evil consists chiefly in turning away from Him: wherefore all
the fears mentioned above imply either moral evil or moral good. Now
natural fear is presupposed to moral good and evil, and so it is not
numbered among these kinds of fear.

Reply Obj. 3: The relation of servant to master is based on the power
which the master exercises over the servant; whereas, on the
contrary, the relation of a son to his father or of a wife to her
husband is based on the son's affection towards his father to whom he
submits himself, or on the wife's affection towards her husband to
whom she binds herself in the union of love. Hence filial and chaste
fea