them
that kill the body," thus forbidding worldly fear. Now nothing but
what is evil is forbidden by God. Therefore worldly fear is evil.
_I answer that,_ As shown above (I-II, Q. 1, A. 3; I-II, Q. 18, A. 1;
I-II, Q. 54, A. 2) moral acts and habits take their name and species
from their objects. Now the proper object of the appetite's movement
is the final good: so that, in consequence, every appetitive movement
is both specified and named from its proper end. For if anyone were
to describe covetousness as love of work because men work on account
of covetousness, this description would be incorrect, since the
covetous man seeks work not as end but as a means: the end that he
seeks is wealth, wherefore covetousness is rightly described as the
desire or the love of wealth, and this is evil. Accordingly worldly
love is, properly speaking, the love whereby a man trusts in the
world as his end, so that worldly love is always evil. Now fear is
born of love, since man fears the loss of what he loves, as Augustine
states (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 33). Now worldly fear is that which arises
from worldly love as from an evil root, for which reason worldly fear
is always evil.
Reply Obj. 1: One may have regard for men in two ways. First in so
far as there is in them something divine, for instance, the good of
grace or of virtue, or at least of the natural image of God: and in
this way those are blamed who have no regard for man. Secondly, one
may have regard for men as being in opposition to God, and thus it is
praiseworthy to have no regard for men, according as we read of Elias
or Eliseus (Ecclus. 48:13): "In his days he feared not the prince."
Reply Obj. 2: When the secular power inflicts punishment in order to
withdraw men from sin, it is acting as God's minister, according to
Rom. 13:4, "For he is God's minister, an avenger to execute wrath
upon him that doth evil." To fear the secular power in this way is
part, not of worldly fear, but of servile or initial fear.
Reply Obj. 3: It is natural for man to shrink from detriment to his
own body and loss of worldly goods, but to forsake justice on that
account is contrary to natural reason. Hence the Philosopher says
(Ethic. iii, 1) that there are certain things, viz. sinful deeds,
which no fear should drive us to do, since to do such things is worse
than to suffer any punishment whatever.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 4]
Whether Servile Fear Is Go
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