is the privation of some particular good, yet absolutely
speaking, it is a good, in so far as it is ordained to the last end.

In relation to God the evil of fault can come to us, if we be
separated from Him: and in this way God can and ought to be feared.

Reply Obj. 1: This objection considers the object of fear as being
the evil which a man shuns.

Reply Obj. 2: In God, we may consider both His justice, in respect of
which He punishes those who sin, and His mercy, in respect of which
He sets us free: in us the consideration of His justice gives rise to
fear, but the consideration of His mercy gives rise to hope, so that,
accordingly, God is the object of both hope and fear, but under
different aspects.

Reply Obj. 3: The evil of fault is not from God as its author but
from us, in for far as we forsake God: while the evil of punishment
is from God as its author, in so far as it has character of a good,
since it is something just, through being inflicted on us justly;
although originally this is due to the demerit of sin: thus it is
written (Wis. 1:13, 16): "God made not death . . . but the wicked
with works and words have called it to them."
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 2]

Whether Fear Is Fittingly Divided into Filial, Initial, Servile and
Worldly Fear?

Objection 1: It would seem that fear is unfittingly divided into
filial, initial, servile and worldly fear. For Damascene says (De
Fide Orth. ii, 15) that there are six kinds of fear, viz. "laziness,
shamefacedness," etc. of which we have treated above (I-II, Q. 41, A.
4), and which are not mentioned in the division in question.
Therefore this division of fear seems unfitting.

Obj. 2: Further, each of these fears is either good or evil. But
there is a fear, viz. natural fear, which is neither morally good,
since it is in the demons, according to James 2:19, "The devils . . .
believe and tremble," nor evil, since it is in Christ, according to
Mk. 14:33, Jesus "began to fear and be heavy." Therefore the
aforesaid division of fear is insufficient.

Obj. 3: Further, the relation of son to father differs from that of
wife to husband, and this again from that of servant to master. Now
filial fear, which is that of the son in comparison with his father,
is distinct from servile fear, which is that of the servant in
comparison with his master. Therefore chaste fear, which seems to be
that of the wife in comparison with her husband