sins, as Augustine states (In primam canon. Joan. Tract. ix), so
too, hope leads to charity, in as much as a man through hoping to be
rewarded by God, is encouraged to love God and obey His commandments.
On the other hand, in the order of perfection charity naturally
precedes hope, wherefore, with the advent of charity, hope is made
more perfect, because we hope chiefly in our friends. It is in this
sense that Ambrose states (Obj. 1) that charity flows from hope: so
that this suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply Obj. 2: Hope and every movement of the appetite proceed from
some kind of love, whereby the expected good is loved. But not every
kind of hope proceeds from charity, but only the movement of living
hope, viz. that whereby man hopes to obtain good from God, as from a
friend.
Reply Obj. 3: The Master is speaking of living hope, which is
naturally preceded by charity and the merits caused by charity.
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QUESTION 18
OF THE SUBJECT OF HOPE
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider the subject of hope, under which head there are
four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the virtue of hope is in the will as its subject?
(2) Whether it is in the blessed?
(3) Whether it is in the damned?
(4) Whether there is certainty in the hope of the wayfarer?
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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 18, Art. 1]
Whether Hope Is in the Will As Its Subject?
Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not in the will as its
subject. For the object of hope is an arduous good, as stated above
(Q. 17, A. 1; I-II, Q. 40, A. 1). Now the arduous is the object, not
of the will, but of the irascible. Therefore hope is not in the will
but in the irascible.
Obj. 2: Further, where one suffices it is superfluous to add another.
Now charity suffices for the perfecting of the will, which is the
most perfect of the virtues. Therefore hope is not in the will.
Obj. 3: Further, the one same power cannot exercise two acts at the
same time; thus the intellect cannot understand many things
simultaneously. Now the act of hope can be at the same time as an act
of charity. Since, then, the act of charity evidently belongs to the
will, it follows that the act of hope does not belong to that power:
so that, therefore, hope is not in the will.
_On the contrary,_ The soul is not apprehensive of God save as
regards the mind in which is memory, intellect and will, as Augustine
declares (De Trin. xi
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