ts about things pertaining to the law of God.

Reply Obj. 4: That precept of the Law does not mean that man should
meditate on God's law by sleeping, but during sleep, i.e. that he
should meditate on the law of God when he is preparing to sleep,
because this leads to his having better phantasms while asleep, in so
far as our movements pass from the state of vigil to the state of
sleep, as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. i, 13). In like manner we
are commanded to meditate on the Law in every action of ours, not
that we are bound to be always actually thinking about the Law, but
that we should regulate all our actions according to it.
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QUESTION 17

OF HOPE, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF
(In Eight Articles)

After treating of faith, we must consider hope and (1) hope itself;
(2) the gift of fear; (3) the contrary vices; (4) the corresponding
precepts. The first of these points gives rise to a twofold
consideration: (1) hope, considered in itself; (2) its subject.

Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether hope is a virtue?

(2) Whether its object is eternal happiness?

(3) Whether, by the virtue of hope, one man may hope for another's
happiness?

(4) Whether a man may lawfully hope in man?

(5) Whether hope is a theological virtue?

(6) Of its distinction from the other theological virtues?

(7) Of its relation to faith;

(8) Of its relation to charity.
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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 17, Art. 1]

Whether Hope Is a Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not a virtue. For "no man
makes ill use of a virtue," as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. ii,
18). But one may make ill use of hope, since the passion of hope,
like the other passions, is subject to a mean and extremes. Therefore
hope is not a virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, no virtue results from merits, since "God works
virtue in us without us," as Augustine states (De Grat. et Lib. Arb.
xvii). But hope is caused by grace and merits, according to the
Master (Sent. iii, D, 26). Therefore hope is not a virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, "virtue is the disposition of a perfect thing"
(Phys. vii, text. 17, 18). But hope is the disposition of an
imperfect thing, of one, namely, that lacks what it hopes to have.
Therefore hope is not a virtue.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. i, 33) that the three
daughters of Job signify these three virtues, faith, hope and
charity. Therefore hope is a vi