ch combine both
strategical and tactical operations and situations to a greater
degree than do the other two schemes. Its only weakness is the
fact that the entire fleet is not operated as a unit; not even a
large fraction, but only about one-half. Like each of the other
two schemes, however, it has its distinctive field of usefulness.

Its main advantage is its realism--the fact that two powerful naval
forces, each composed of all the elements of a naval force, seek
each other out; or else one evades and the other seeks; and then
finally they fight a fairly realistic battle; or else one successfully
evades the other; or else minor actions occur between detachments,
and no major result occurs; just as happens in war.

Strategically, this scheme is less valuable than the other two;
tactically, more so. For the experience and the records of the
staff this scheme is less valuable than the other two, but for the
training of the fleet it is more so.

Of course, the division of games for staff and fleet training into
three general schemes is arbitrary, and not wholly correct; for
no such division really exists, and in practice it would not be
observed. The thought of the writer is merely to point out that,
in a general way, the schemes may be divided into three classes,
and to show the convenience of doing so--or at least of recognizing
that there are three general kinds of games, and that each kind
has its advantages and likewise its disadvantages.

In our navy, only three strategic problems or maneuvers, devised
at the department, have been worked out at sea--one in May, and
one in October, 1915, and one in August, 1916: all belonged in
the second category. They were devised by the General Board and
the War College, as we had no staff. The solving of the problems
by the commander-in-chief aroused the greatest interest not only
in the fleet, but in the Navy Department, in fact, throughout the
entire navy, and to a surprising degree throughout the country,
especially among the people on the Atlantic coast. Discussions
of the utmost value were aroused and carried on, and a degree of
co-operation between the department, the War College, and the fleet,
never attained before, was realized. If a routine could be devised
whereby such problems could be solved by practical games, say once
a month, and the results analyzed and recorded in moving-picture
form by the staff in Washington, we could see our way in a few
years' time t