as well as for the benefit of the fleet, certain
members of the staff would go out with the fleet to note in what
ways, each problem sent down was defective, in what ways good--and
in what ways it could be modified with benefit. The successive
situations and solutions, made first by the staff and subsequently
by the fleet, can then be photographed and made part of the history
of war problems, for the library of the staff.

In laying out the war problems, the staff will be guided naturally
by the ends in view--first to work out solutions of strategic,
logistic, and tactical situations in future wars, and second to
give opportunity to the various divisions, ships, turret crews,
engineers' forces, etc., for drills that will train them to meet
probable contingencies in future wars.

This double end will not be so difficult of attainment as might at
first sight seem, for the reason that the solution of any problem
which represents a situation actually probable will automatically
provide all the minor situations necessary to drill the various
bodies; and the more inherently probable a situation is, the more
probable will be the situations in which the various flag-officers,
captains, quartermasters, engineers' forces, turret crews, etc.,
will find themselves.

Of course, the prime difficulty in devising realistic problems is
the fact that in war our whole fleet would be employed together
against an enemy fleet; and as the staff cannot supply an enemy
fleet, it must either imagine an enemy fleet, divert a small part
of our fleet to represent an enemy fleet, or else divide our fleet
into two approximately equal parts, one "red," and one "blue."

_First Scheme_.--The first scheme has its usefulness in working
out the actual handling of the fleet as a whole; and considering
the purposes of strategy only, is the most important, though, of
course, "contacts" with the enemy cannot be simulated. From the
standpoint of fleet tactical drill, and the standpoint of that part
of strategy which arranges for handling large tactical situations
with success, it is useful, since it provides for the tactical
handling of the entire fleet. This certainly is important; for if
the personnel are to be so trained that the actual fleet shall be
handled with maximum effectiveness in battle, training in handling
that actual fleet must frequently be had; the fleet is a machine,
and no machine is complete if any of its parts is lacking.

It may be