The end of April was a period of recuperation for the Germans. They were
still suffering from the confusion caused by their set-backs of March,
and especially of April 9. Only two attempts at an offensive were
made--one on the Cote du Poivre (April 18) and one on the front south of
Douaumont. Both were repulsed with great losses. The French, in turn,
attacked on the 15th of April near Douaumont, on the 28th north of Le
Mort Homme. It was not until May that the new German tactics were
revealed: vigorous, but partial, attacks, directed now against one
point, now against another.
[Sidenote: Artillery directed against Hill 304.]
[Sidenote: Cumieres and Le Mort Homme.]
On May 4 there began a terrible artillery preparation, directed against
Hill 304. This was followed by attacks of infantry, which surged up the
shell-blasted slopes, first to the northwest, then north, and finally
northeast. The attack of the 7th was made by three divisions of fresh
troops which had not previously been in action before Verdun. No gains
were secured. Every foot of ground taken in the first rush was
recaptured by French counter-attacks. During the night of the 18th a
savage onslaught was made against the woods of Avocourt, without the
least success. On the 20th and 21st, three divisions were hurled against
Le Mort Homme, which they finally took; but they could go no farther.
The 23d and 24th were terrible days. The Germans stormed the village of
Cumieres; their advance guard penetrated as far as Chattancourt. On the
26th, however, the French were again in possession of Cumieres and the
slopes of Le Mort Homme; and if the Germans, by means of violent
counter-attacks, were able to get a fresh foothold in the ruins of
Cumieres, they made no attempt to progress farther. The battles of the
left river-bank were now over; on this side of the Meuse there were to
be only unimportant local engagements and the usual artillery fire.
[Sidenote: Battles on right of Meuse.]
[Sidenote: Mangin's division attacks.]
This shift of the German offensive activity from the left side of the
Meuse to the right is explained by the activity shown at the same time
in this sector by the French. The French command was not deceived by the
German tactics; they intended to husband their strength for the future
Somme offensive. For them Verdun was a sacrificial sector to which they
sent, from now on, few men, scant munitions, and only artillery of the
older type. The
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