ral situation required it,
with as great a force as I might then be able to make available.

[Sidenote: Pressure on Italian front.]

[Sidenote: Heroic French defense at Verdun.]

By the end of May, 1916, the pressure of the enemy on the Italian front
had assumed such serious proportions that the Russian campaign was
opened early in June, and the brilliant successes gained by our allies
against the Austrians at once caused a movement of German troops from
the western to the eastern front. This, however, did not lessen the
pressure on Verdun. The heroic defense of our French allies had already
gained many weeks of inestimable value and had caused the enemy very
heavy losses; but the strain continued to increase. In view, therefore,
of the situation in the various theatres of war, it was eventually
agreed between General Joffre and myself that the combined French and
British offensive should not be postponed beyond the end of June.

[Sidenote: Objects of new offensive.]

The object of that offensive was threefold:

(i.) To relieve the pressure on Verdun.

(ii.) To assist our allies in the other theatres of war by stopping any
further transfer of German troops from the western front.

(iii.) To wear down the strength of the forces opposed to us.

[Sidenote: Enemy attempts at interference.]

While my final preparations were in progress the enemy made two
unsuccessful attempts to interfere with my arrangements. The first,
directed on May 21, 1916, against our positions on the Vimy Ridge, south
and southeast of Souchez, resulted in a small enemy gain of no strategic
or tactical importance; and rather than weaken my offensive by involving
additional troops in the task of recovering the lost ground, I decided
to consolidate a position in rear of our original line.

[Sidenote: A position lost and retaken.]

The second enemy attack was delivered on June 2, 1916, on a front of
over one and a half miles from Mount Sorrell to Hooge, and succeeded in
penetrating to a maximum depth of 700 yards. As the southern part of the
lost position commanded our trenches, I judged it necessary to recover
it, and by an attack launched on June 13, 1916, carefully prepared and
well executed, this was successfully accomplished by the troops on the
spot.

Neither of these enemy attacks succeeded in delaying the preparations
for the major operations which I had in view.

These preparations were necessarily very elaborate and took conside