their own Government, which deliberately destroyed
their homes as a military measure. Every Russian, even the military
officers who were responsible for this policy of destruction, now
realize that the adoption of that policy was one of the greatest
mistakes Russia has made during the war. For it has cost her the support
of a large and important body of Letts, Poles, Jews, and Lithuanians.
The theory was that to leave large masses of civilians behind the
forward-pushing German lines would provide Germany with a large number
of spies, as well as with sustenance for its armies. To some extent,
too, it was believed that buildings left standing in the Russian retreat
might serve as protection and cover for German artillery. So everything
was destroyed--farm-houses, barns, churches, schools, orchards, even
haystacks. Whenever the Russian lines retracted before the unbearable
pounding of the terrible German guns, they left only a desert for the
Kaiser's men to cross.

[Sidenote: Loss too great to be compensated by gain.]

War is not a parlor game. A great deal of destruction is inevitable in
the nature of war, and sometimes in wars of the past commanders have
deliberately laid waste large sections of beautiful country to handicap
the enemy, and the results have justified this destruction. A ten per
cent social and economic loss is gladly borne by a nation at war for a
ninety per cent military gain. Perhaps a commander is even justified in
inflicting a forty-nine per cent social and economic loss on his country
for a fifty-one per cent military gain. But the deliberate ravaging of
Poland and the Baltic provinces was a ninety per cent social and
economic loss for a ten per cent military gain--something that is never
justifiable.

[Sidenote: Relief should meet refugees.]

It is very difficult for a general to remember that there are other
factors in war besides the military factors, and we must not be too
severe in our criticism of the Russian General Staff because it saw only
the ten per cent military gain and overlooked the ninety per cent
political and economic loss. The order which made a desert of thousands
of square miles of the best territory in Russia was countermanded,
anyway, but not until the harm had been done. But now the only concern
of Russia and of the friends of Russia should be to confine the damage
to the irremediable minimum. To that end it is necessary to handle the
great streams of refugees intelligent