FREE BOOKS

Author's List




PREV.   NEXT  
|<   101   102   103   104   105   106   107   108   109   110   111   112   113   114   115   116   117   118   119   120   121   122   123   124   125  
126   127   128   129   130   131   132   133   134   135   136   137   138   139   140   141   142   143   144   145   146   147   148   149   150   >>   >|  
was, I believe, almost impossible for the Germans to send troops to Transylvania, which accounts for the rapidity of the Rumanian advance at the beginning of their operations. The fallacy in the Allied reasoning seems to me to have been that every one overlooked certain vital factors in the German situation. First, that she would ultimately support any threat against Hungary to the limit of her capacity, even if she had to evacuate Belgium to get troops for this purpose. For with Hungary out of the war it is a mate in five moves for the Central Empires. Second: the Allies failed to analyze correctly the troop situation on the eastern front, apparently failing to grasp one vital point. An army can defend itself in winter, with the heavy cold and snows of Russia sweeping the barren spaces, with perhaps sixty per cent of the number of troops required to hold those identical lines in summer. It should have been obvious that, when the cold weather set in in the north, the Germans would take advantage of this situation, and by going on the defensive in the north release the margin representing the difference in men required to hold their lines in summer and in winter. Possibly the same condition applies to the west, though I cannot speak with any authority on that subject. Apparently this obvious action of the Germans is exactly what happened. When their northern front had been combed, we find forces subtracted piecemeal from the north, reaching an aggregate of thirty divisions, or at least nearly fifteen divisions more than had been anticipated. The doom of Rumania was sealed. [Sidenote: Retreating armies must reach defenses.] What happened in the Russian effort to support Rumania is exactly what has occurred in nearly all the drives that I have been in during this war. An army once started in retreat in the face of superior forces can hold only when supported _en bloc_ or when it reaches a fortified line. The Germans with all their cleverness and efficiency were not able to stop the Russian offensive of 1916 until they had fallen back on the fortified lines of the Stokhod in front of Kovel. In the Galician drive against the Russians in 1915, the armies of the Tsar were not able to hold until they reached the San River, on which they fought a series of rear-guard actions. [Sidenote: Russian corps on Sereth line.] So it was in Rumania. The Russian corps arriving on the installment plan were swept away by the momentum
PREV.   NEXT  
|<   101   102   103   104   105   106   107   108   109   110   111   112   113   114   115   116   117   118   119   120   121   122   123   124   125  
126   127   128   129   130   131   132   133   134   135   136   137   138   139   140   141   142   143   144   145   146   147   148   149   150   >>   >|  



Top keywords:

Germans

 

Russian

 

situation

 

Rumania

 

troops

 

Sidenote

 

obvious

 
summer
 

winter

 

fortified


armies

 

required

 

divisions

 

support

 

forces

 

happened

 
Hungary
 

defenses

 

northern

 

aggregate


combed

 

thirty

 

occurred

 

effort

 

fifteen

 

piecemeal

 
anticipated
 

reaching

 

sealed

 

Retreating


subtracted

 

fought

 

series

 

reached

 

Russians

 

momentum

 

installment

 

arriving

 
actions
 

Sereth


Galician
 
superior
 

supported

 
retreat
 

started

 
reaches
 

cleverness

 

Stokhod

 

fallen

 

efficiency