t against this same army--on a slightly extended
front--three Austrian divisions, two Austrian cavalry divisions, two
Turkish divisions, and nine German divisions. The army on the extreme
Russian left, whose duty it was to participate in the offensive in the
Bukovina, had made important advances toward Lemberg from the south, and
just at the time that Rumania entered the war it also was subjected to
tremendous enemy counter-attacks. For several weeks it held its position
only with the greatest difficulty and by diverting to itself most of the
available reserves. Something more than one army corps did endeavor to
cooperate with Rumania, but the situation I have described in Galicia
made it impossible for sufficient supports to reach the Bukovina
offensive to enable it to fulfill its mission.

[Sidenote: Reasons for delay in munitions.]

Thus we see that after the first month of the campaign the cooperative
factors which alone had justified Rumania's entering into the war had
proved to be failures. The arrival of material from Russia was delayed
because, after Turtekaia was taken, a new Russian corps was sent to the
Dobrudja to stiffen up that front. The railroad communications were bad
and immediately became congested by the movements of troops, thus
interfering with the shipping of badly needed material. I have since
heard the Russian reactionary government charged with purposely holding
up these shipments; but I am inclined to believe that my explanation of
the cause of the delays in the arrival of material is the correct one.

[Sidenote: Allies underestimated German force.]

The greatest mistake on the part of the Allies was their estimate of the
number of troops that the Germans could send to Rumania during the fall
of 1916. As I have said, experts placed this number at from ten to
sixteen divisions, but, to the best of my judgment, they sent, between
the 1st of September and the 1st of January, not less than thirty. The
German commitments to the Rumanian front came by express, and the
Russian supports, because of the paucity of lines of communication, came
by freight. The moment that it became evident what the Germans could do
in the way of sending troops, Rumania was doomed.

[Sidenote: Russians too late to save Bucharest.]

The move of Alexieff and the Russian High Command in the middle of
October, which is one of tangible record and not of opinion, should
absolutely eliminate the charges of bad faith on the