s captured amounted to over 2,000, bringing the total since July
1, 1916, to over 10,000.

[Sidenote: Enemy able to bring up fresh troops.]

There was strong evidence that the enemy forces engaged on the battle
front had been severely shaken by the repeated successes gained by
ourselves and our allies; but the great strength and depth of his
defenses had secured for him sufficient time to bring up fresh troops,
and he had still many powerful fortifications, both trenches, villages,
and woods, to which he could cling in our front and on our flanks.

We had, indeed, secured a footing on the main ridge, but only on a front
of 6,000 yards, and desirous though I was to follow up quickly the
successes we had won, it was necessary first to widen this front.

[Sidenote: Pozieres and Thiepval still to be carried.]

West of Bazentin-le-Petit the villages of Pozieres and Thiepval,
together with the whole elaborate system of trenches around, between and
on the main ridge behind them, had still to be carried. An advance
further east would, however, eventually turn these defenses, and all
that was for the present required on the left flank of our attack was a
steady, methodical, step by step advance as already ordered.

[Sidenote: Salient at Delville, Wood and Longueval.]

On our right flank the situation called for stronger measures. At
Delville Wood and Longueval our lines formed a sharp salient, from which
our front ran on the one side westward to Pozieres, and on the other
southward to Maltz Horn Farm. At Maltz Horn Farm our lines joined the
French, and the allied front continued still southward to the village of
Hem, on the Somme.

[Sidenote: Enemy's advantages.]

This pronounced salient invited counterattacks by the enemy. He
possessed direct observation on it all around from Guillemont on the
southeast to High Wood on the northwest. He could bring a concentric
fire of artillery, to bear not only on the wood and village, but also on
the confined space behind, through which ran the French communications
as well as ours, where great numbers of guns, besides ammunition and
impediments of all sorts, had necessarily to be crowded together. Having
been in occupation of this ground for nearly two years, he knew every
foot of it, and could not fail to appreciate the possibilities of
causing us heavy loss there by indirect artillery fire; while it was
evident that, if he could drive in the salient in our line and so gain
direc