[Sidenote: Positions the French must capture.]

In swinging up my own right it was very important that the French line
north of the Somme should be advanced at the same time in close
combination with the movement of the British troops. The line of
demarkation agreed on between the French commander and myself ran from
Maltz Horn Farm due eastward to the Combles Valley and then
northeastward up that valley to a point midway between Sailly-Saillisel
and Morval. These two villages had been fixed upon as objectives,
respectively, of the French left and of my right. In order to advance in
co-operation with my right, and eventually to reach Sailly-Saillisel,
our allies had still to fight their way up that portion of the main
ridge which lies between the Combles Valley on the west and the River
Tortille on the east. To do so they had to capture, in the first place,
the strongly fortified villages of Maurepas, Le Forest, Rancourt, and
Fregicourt, besides many woods and strong systems of trenches. As the
high ground on each side of the Combles Valley commands the slopes of
the ridge on the opposite side, it was essential that the advance of the
two armies should be simultaneous and made in the closest co-operation.
This was fully recognized by both armies, and our plans were made
accordingly.

[Sidenote: A pause necessary.]

To carry out the necessary preparations to deal with the difficult
situation outlined above a short pause was necessary, to enable tired
troops to be relieved and guns to be moved forward; while at the same
time old communications had to be improved and new ones made.
Intrenchments against probable counterattacks could not be neglected,
and fresh dispositions of troops were required for the new attacks to be
directed eastward.

[Sidenote: Pressure on whole front.]

It was also necessary to continue such pressure on the rest of our
front, not only on the Ancre, but further south, as would make it
impossible for the enemy to devote himself entirely to resisting the
advance between Delville Wood and the Somme. In addition, it was
desirable further to secure our hold on the main ridge west of Delville
Wood by gaining more ground to our front in that direction. Orders were
therefore issued in accordance with the general considerations explained
above, and, without relaxing pressure along the enemy's front from
Delville Wood to the west, preparations for an attack on Guillemont were
pushed on.

[Sidenote: