ed by the enemy
artillery, making it necessary for our infantry to advance to the attack
across 400 yards of open ground. None the less they forced their way
into Mametz, and reached their objective in the valley beyond, first
throwing out a defensive flank toward Fricourt on their left. At the
same time the enemy's trenches were entered north of Fricourt, so that
the enemy's garrison in that village was pressed on three sides. Further
north, though the village of La Boisselle and Ovillers for the time
being resisted our attack, our troops drove deeply into the German lines
on the flanks of these strongholds, and so paved the way for their
capture later.

[Sidenote: Fight for the Leipsic Salient.]

On the spur running south from Thiepval the work known as the Leipsic
Salient was stormed, and severe fighting took place for the possession
of the village and its defenses. Here and north of the valley of the
Ancre, as far as Serre, on the left flank of our attack, our initial
successes were not sustained. Striking progress was made at many points,
and parties of troops penetrated the enemy's positions to the outer
defenses of Grandcourt, and also to Pendant Copse and Serre; but the
enemy's continued resistance at Thiepval and Beaumont Hamel made it
impossible to forward reinforcements and ammunition, and in spite of
their gallant efforts our troops were forced to withdraw during the
night to their own lines.

[Sidenote: The attack at Gommecourt.]

The subsidiary attack at Gommecourt also forced its way into the enemy's
positions, but there met with such vigorous opposition that as soon as
it was considered that the attack had fulfilled its object our troops
were withdrawn.

[Sidenote: Instructions to General Gough.]

In view of the general situation at the end of the first day's
operations I decided that the best course was to press forward on a
front extending from our junction with the French to a point half way
between La Boisselle and Contalmaison, and to limit the offensive on our
left for the present to a slow and methodical advance. North of the
Ancre such preparations were to be made as would hold the enemy to his
positions and enable the attack to be resumed there later if desirable.
In order that General Sir Henry Rawlinson might be left free to
concentrate his attention on the portion of the front where the attack
was to be pushed home, I also decided to place the operations against
the front, La Boissell