ustice on every account both
evil and disgraceful to him who commits it? Do we admit this, or not?

_Cri._ We do admit it.

_Socr._ On no account, therefore, ought we to act unjustly.

_Cri._ Surely not.

_Socr._ Neither ought one who is injured to return the injury, as the
multitude think, since it is on no account right to act unjustly.

_Cri._ It appears not.

_Socr._ What, then? Is it right to do evil, Crito, or not?

_Cri._ Surely it is not right, Socrates.

_Socr._ But what? To do evil in return when one has been evil-entreated,
is that right, or not?

_Cri._ By no means.

_Socr._ For to do evil to men differs in no respect from committing
injustice.

_Cri._ You say truly.

_Socr._ It is not right, therefore, to return an injury, or to do evil
to any man, however one may have suffered from him. But take care,
Crito, that in allowing these things you do not allow them contrary to
your opinion, for I know that to some few only these things both do
appear, and will appear, to be true. They, then, to whom these things
appear true, and they to whom they do not, have no sentiment in common,
and must needs despise each other, while they look to each other's
opinions. Consider well, then, whether you coincide and think with me,
and whether we can begin our deliberations from this point--that it is
never right either to do an injury or to return an injury, or when one
has been evil-entreated, to revenge one's self by doing evil in return,
or do you dissent from, and not coincide in this principle? For so it
appears to me, both long since and now, but if you in any respect think
otherwise, say so and inform me. But if you persist in your former
opinions, hear what follows.

_Cri._ I do persist in them, and think with you. Speak on, then.

_Socr._ I say next, then, or rather I ask; whether when a man has
promised to do things that are just he ought to do them, or evade his
promise?

_Cri._ He ought to do them.

11. _Socr._ Observe, then, what follows. By departing hence without the
leave of the city, are we not doing evil to some, and that to those to
whom we ought least of all to do it, or not? And do we abide by what we
agreed on as being just, or do we not?

_Cri._ I am unable to answer your question, Socrates; for I do not
understand it.

_Socr._ Then, consider it thus. If, while we were preparing to run away,
or by whatever name we should call it, the laws and commonwealth should
come, and, pres