on the north side on the 16th. He
thought Bertrand's corps would suffice to defend the north and west,
and left the defence on that side in a singularly vague state.]

[Footnote 379: Dedem de Gelder, "Mems.," p. 345, severely blames
Napoleon's inaction on the 17th; either he should have attacked the
allies before Bennigsen and Bernadotte came up, or have retreated
while there was time.]

[Footnote 380: Lord Burghersh, Sir George Jackson, Odeleben, and Fain
all assign this conversation to the night of the 16th; but Merveldt's
official account of it (inclosed with Lord Cathcart's despatches),
gives it as on October 17th, at 2 p.m. ("F.O.," Russia, No. 86). I
follow this version rather than that given by Fain.]

[Footnote 381: That the British Ministers did not intend anything of
the kind, even in the hour of triumph, is seen by Castlereagh's
despatch of November 13th, 1813, to Lord Aberdeen, our envoy at the
Austrian Court: "We don't wish to impose any dishonourable condition
upon France, which limiting the number of her ships would be: but she
must not be left in possession of this point [Antwerp]" ("Castlereagh
Papers," 3rd series, vol. i., p. 76).]

[Footnote 382: Boyen describes the surprising effects of the fire of
the British rocket battery that served in Bernadotte's army. Captain
Bogue brought it forward to check the charge of a French column
against the Swedes. He was shot down, but Lieutenant Strangways poured
in so hot a fire that the column was "blown asunder like an ant-heap,"
the men rushing back to cover amidst the loud laughter of the allies.]

[Footnote 383: The premature explosion was of course due, not to
Napoleon, but to the flurry of a serjeant and the skilful flanking
move of Sacken's light troops, for which see Cathcart and Marmont. The
losses at Leipzig were rendered heavier by Napoleon's humane refusal
to set fire to the suburbs so as to keep off the allies. He rightly
said he could have saved many thousand French had he done so. This is
true. But it is strange that he had given no order for the
construction of other bridges. Pelet and Fain affirm that he gave a
verbal order; but, as Marbot explains, Berthier, the Chief of the
Staff, had adopted the pedantic custom of never acting on anything
less than _a written order_, which was not given. The neglect to
secure means for retreat is all the stranger as the final miseries at
the Beresina were largely due to official blundering of the same ki