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tte_ on their rear. Napoleon on February 25th advised Joseph to try and gain over that prince, who had some very suspicious relations with the French General Maison in Belgium. Probably Gneisenau wished to spare his men for political reasons.] [Footnote 428: Bernhardi's "Toll," vol. iv., p. 697. Lord Burghersh wrote from Troyes (March 12th): "I am convinced this army will not be risked in a general action.... S. would almost wish to be back upon the Rhine." So again on the 19th he wrote to Colonel Hudson Lowe from Pougy: "I cannot say much for our activity; I am unable to explain the causes of our apathy--the facts are too evident to be disputed. We have been ten days at Troyes, one at Pont-sur-Seine, two at Arcis, and are now at this place. We go tomorrow to Brienne" ("Unpublished Mems. of Sir H. Lowe"). Stewart wittily said that Napoleon came to Arcis to feel Schwarzenberg's pulse.] [Footnote 428: Letters of March 20th to Clarke.] [Footnote 430: "Castlereagh Papers," vol. ix., pp. 325, 332.] [Footnote 431: These letters were written in pairs--the one being official, the other confidential. Caulaincourt's replies show that he appreciated them highly (see Fain, Appendix).] [Footnote 432: From Caulaincourt's letter of March 3rd to Napoleon; Bignon, vol. xiii., p. 379.] [Footnote 433: "Castlereagh Papers," vol. ix., p. 555.] [Footnote 434: "Castlereagh Papers," vol. ix., pp. 335, 559. Caulaincourt's project of March 15th much resembled that dictated by Napoleon three days later; Austria was to have Venetia as far as the Adige, the kingdom of Italy to go to Eugene, and the duchy of Warsaw to the King of Saxony, etc. The allies rejected it (Fain, p. 388).] [Footnote 435: Fournier, p. 232, rebuts, and I think successfully, Houssaye's objections (p. 287) to its genuineness. Besides, the letter is on the same moral level with the instructions of January 4th to Caulaincourt, and resembles them in many respects. No forger could have known of those instructions. At Elba, Napoleon admitted that he was wrong in not making peace at this time. "_Mais je me croyais assez fort pour ne pas la faire, et je me suis trompe_" (Lord Holland's "Foreign Rem.," p. 319). The same writer states (p. 296) that he saw the official correspondence about Chatillon: it gave him the highest opinion of Caulaincourt, but N.'s conduct was "full of subterfuge and artifice."] [Footnote 436: Castlereagh to Clancarty, March 18th.] [Footnot
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