s. The last
important sentence of the 2 p.m. despatch is not given by Houssaye (p.
159), but is printed by Ropes (p. 383), Siborne (vol. i., p. 453),
Charras (vol. i., p. 136), and Ollech (p. 131). It proves that _as
late as 2 p.m._ Napoleon expected an easy victory over the Prussians.]
[Footnote 489: The best authorities give the Prussians 87,000 men, and
the French 78,000; but the latter estimate includes the corps of
Lobau, 10,000 strong, which did not reach Fleurus till dark.]
[Footnote 490: I follow Houssaye's solution of this puzzle as the
least unsatisfacty, but it does not show why Napoleon should have been
so perplexed. D'Erlon debouched from the wood of Villers Perwin
_exactly where he might have been expected_. Was Napoleon puzzled
because the corps was heading south-east instead of east?]
[Footnote 491: Delbrueck ("Gneisenau," vol. ii., p. 190) shows how the
storm favoured the attack.]
[Footnote 492: I here follow Delbrueck's "Gneisenau" (vol. ii., p. 194)
and Charras (vol. i., p. 163). Reiche ("Mems.," vol ii., p. 193) says
that his corps of 30,800 men lost 12,480 on the 15th and 16th: he
notes that Bluecher and Nostitz probably owed their escape to the
plainness of their uniforms and headgear.]
[Footnote 493: "Waterloo Letters," Nos. 163 and 169, prove that the
time was 3 p.m. and not 3.30; see also Kincaid's account in Fitchett's
"Wellington's Men" (p. 120).]
[Footnote 494: "Waterloo Letters," No. 169.]
[Footnote 495: See Houssaye, p. 205, for the sequence of these
events.]
[Footnote 496: Ollech, pp. 167-171. Colonel Basil Jackson, in his
"Waterloo and St. Helena" (printed for private circulation), p. 64,
states that he had been employed in examining and reporting on the
Belgian roads, and did so on the road leading south from Wavre. This
report had been sent to Gneisenau, and must have given him greater
confidence on the night of the 16th.]
[Footnote 497: O'Connor Morris, p. 176, approves Napoleon's criticism,
and censures Gneisenau's move on Wavre: but surely Wavre combined more
advantages than any other position. It was accessible for the whole
Prussian army (including Buelow); it was easily defensible (as the
event proved); and it promised a reunion with Wellington for the
defence of Brussels. Houssaye says (p. 233) that Gneisenau did not at
once foresee the immense consequences of his action. Of course he did
not, because he was not sure of Wellington; but he took all the steps
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