ed up Maret's note; the
sentence quoted above is doubtless the Emperor's. The same author
proves that Maret's advice had always been more pacific than was
supposed, and that now, in his old position of Secretary of State, he
gave Caulaincourt valuable help during the negotiations at Chatillon.]
[Footnote 389: "Castlereagh Papers," 3rd series, vol. i., p. 74. This
was written, of course, before he heard of the Frankfurt proposals;
but it anticipates them in a remarkable way. Thiers states that
Castlereagh, after hearing of them, sent Aberdeen new instructions. I
cannot find any in our archives. This letter warned Aberdeen against
any compromise on the subject of Antwerp; but it is clear that
Castlereagh, when he came to the allied headquarters, was a partisan
of peace, as compared with the Czar and the Prussian patriots.
Schwarzenberg wrote (January 26th) at Langres: "We ought to make peace
here: our Kaiser, also Stadion, Metternich, even Castlereagh, are
fully of this opinion--but Kaiser Alexander!"]
[Footnote 390: Fournier, "Der Congress von Chatillon," p. 242.]
[Footnote 391: "Castlereagh Papers," _loc. cit._, p. 112.]
[Footnote 392: Metternich. "Memoirs," vol. i., p. 214.]
[Footnote 393: "F.O.," Austria, No. 102.]
[Footnote 394: "Lettres inedites" (November 6th, 1813).]
[Footnote 395: The memorandum is endorsed, "Extract of Instructions
delivered to me by Gen. Pozzo di Borgo, 18 Dec, 1813" ("Russia," No.
92).]
[Footnote 396: Metternich's letter to Hudelist, in Fournier, p. 242.]
[Footnote 397: Houssaye's "1814," p. 14; Metternich, "Memoirs," vol.
i., p. 308.]
[Footnote 398: "Our success and everything depend upon our moderation
and justice," he wrote to Lord Bathurst (Napier, bk. xxiii., ch.
ii.).]
[Footnote 399: "Lettres inedites" (November 12th). The date is
important: it refutes Napier's statement (bk. xxiii., ch. iv.) that
the Emperor had planned that Ferdinand should enter Spain early in
November when the disputes between Wellington and the Cortes at Madrid
were at their height. Bignon (vol. xiii., p. 88 _et seq._) says that
Talleyrand's indiscretion revealed the negotiations to the Spanish
Cortes and Wellington; but our general's despatches show that he did
not hear of them before January 9th or 10th. He then wrote: "I have
long suspected that Bonaparte would adopt this expedient; and if he
had had less pride and more common sense, it would have succeeded."]
[Footnote 400: On January
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