e Lord's Prayer.'"[29]

THE ZORACH CASE; THE McCOLLUM CASE LIMITED

In a decision handed down July 11, 1951 the New York Court of Appeals,
one Judge dissenting, sustained the "released time" program of that
State, distinguishing it from the one condemned in the McCollum Case as
follows: "In the New York City program there is neither supervision nor
approval of religious teachers and no solicitation of pupils or
distribution of cards. The religious instruction must be outside the
school building and grounds. There must be no announcement of any kind
in the public schools relative to the program and no comment by any
principal or teacher on the attendance or non-attendance of any pupil
upon religious instruction. All that the school does besides excusing
the pupil is to keep a record--which is not available for any other
purpose--in order to see that the excuses are not taken advantage of and
the school deceived, which is, of course, the same procedure the school
would take in respect of absence for any other reason."[30] On appeal
this decision was sustained by the Supreme Court, six Justices to
three.[31] Said Justice Douglas, speaking for the majority: "We are a
religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being. We
guarantee the freedom to worship as one chooses. We make room for as
wide a variety of beliefs and creeds as the spiritual needs of man deem
necessary. We sponsor an attitude on the part of government that shows
no partiality to any one group and that lets each flourish according to
the zeal of its adherents and the appeal of its dogma. When the state
encourages religious instruction or cooperates with religious
authorities by adjusting the schedule of public events to sectarian
needs, it follows the best of our traditions. For it then respects the
religious nature of our people and accommodates the public service to
their spiritual needs. To hold that it may not would be to find in the
Constitution a requirement that the government show a callous
indifference to religious groups. That would be preferring those who
believe in no religion over those who do believe. Government may not
finance religious groups nor undertake religious instruction nor blend
secular and sectarian education nor use secular institutions to force
one or some religion on any person. But we find no constitutional
requirement which makes it necessary for government to be hostile to
religion and to throw its weight agains