ss. [Greek: epoche] is a
holding back of the opinion, in consequence of which we neither
deny nor affirm anything. [Greek: ataraxia] is repose and
tranquillity of soul. We shall explain how [Greek: ataraxia]
accompanies [Greek: epoche] when we speak of the aim.

CHAPTER V.

_The Sceptic._

What is meant by a Pyrrhonean philosopher can be understood from 11
the idea of the Sceptical School. He is a Pyrrhonean, namely,
who identifies himself with this system.

CHAPTER VI.

_The Origin of Scepticism._

Scepticism arose in the beginning from the hope of attaining 12
[Greek: ataraxia]; for men of the greatest talent were perplexed
by the contradiction of things, and being at a loss what to
believe, began to question what things are true, and what false,
hoping to attain [Greek: ataraxia] as a result of the decision.
The fundamental principle of the Sceptical system is especially
this, namely, to oppose every argument by one of equal weight,
for it seems to us that in this way we finally reach the
position where we have no dogmas.

CHAPTER VII.

_Does the Sceptic Dogmatise?_

We say that the Sceptic does not dogmatise. We do not say 13
this, meaning by the word dogma the popular assent to certain
things rather than others (for the Sceptic does assent to
feelings that are a necessary result of sensation, as for
example, when he is warm or cold, he cannot say that he thinks
he is not warm or cold), but we say this, meaning by dogma the
acceptance of any opinion in regard to the unknown things
investigated by science. For the Pyrrhonean assents to nothing
that is unknown. Furthermore, he does not dogmatise even when 14
he utters the Sceptical formulae in regard to things that are
unknown, such as "Nothing more," or "I decide nothing," or any
of the others about which we shall speak later. For the one who
dogmatises regards the thing about which he is said to
dogmatise, as existing in itself; the Sceptic does not however
regard these formulae as having an absolute existence, for he
assumes that the saying "All is false," includes itself with
other things as false, and likewise the saying "Nothing is
true"; in the same way "Nothing more," states that together with
other things it itself is nothing more, and cancels itself
therefore, as well as other things. We say the same also in
regard to the other Sceptical expressions. In short, if he who 15
dogmatises, ass