_What is the aim of Scepticism?_
It follows naturally in order to treat of the aim of the 25
Sceptical School. An aim is that for which as an end all things
are done or thought, itself depending on nothing, or in other
words, it is the ultimatum of things to be desired. We say,
then, that the aim of the Sceptic is [Greek: ataraxia] in those
things which pertain to the opinion, and moderation in the
things that life imposes. For as soon as he began to 26
philosophise he wished to discriminate between ideas, and to
understand which are true and which are false, in order to
attain [Greek: ataraxia]. He met, however, with contradictions
of equal weight, and, being unable to judge, he withheld his
opinion; and while his judgment was in suspension [Greek:
ataraxia] followed, as if by chance, in regard to matters of
opinion. For he who is of the opinion that anything is either 27
good or bad by nature is always troubled, and when he does not
possess those things that seem to him good he thinks that he is
tortured by the things which are by nature bad, and pursues
those that he thinks to be good. Having acquired them, however,
he falls into greater perturbation, because he is excited beyond
reason and without measure from fear of a change, and he does
everything in his power to retain the things that seem to him
good. But he who is undecided, on the contrary, regarding 28
things that are good and bad by nature, neither seeks nor avoids
anything eagerly, and is therefore in a state of [Greek:
ataraxia]. For that which is related of Apelles the painter
happened to the Sceptic. It is said that as he was once painting
a horse he wished to represent the foam of his mouth in the
picture, but he could not succeed in doing so, and he gave it up
and threw the sponge at the picture with which he had wiped the
colors from the painting. As soon, however, as it touched the
picture it produced a good copy of the foam. The Sceptics
likewise hoped to gain [Greek: ataraxia] by forming judgments 29
in regard to the anomaly between phenomena and the things of
thought, but they were unable to do this, and so they suspended
their judgment; and while their judgment was in suspension
[Greek: ataraxia] followed, as if by chance, as the shadow
follows a body. Nevertheless, we do not consider the Sceptic
wholly undisturbed, but he is disturbed by some things that are
inevitable. We confess that s
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