rmulae "I do not comprehend" and "I do not
understand."_

The formulae "I do not comprehend" and "I do not understand" 201
show a condition of mind in which the Sceptic stands aloof for
the present from asserting or denying anything in regard to the
unknown things under investigation, as is evident from what we
said before about the other formulae.

CHAPTER XXVII.

_The Formula "To place an equal Statement in opposition
to every Statement."_

Furthermore, when we say "Every statement may have an equal 202
statement placed in opposition to it," by "every," we mean all
the statements that we have examined; we do not use the word
"statement" simply, but for a statement which seeks to prove
something dogmatically about things that are unknown, and not at
all one that shows a process of reasoning from premises and
conclusions, but something which is put together in any sort of
way. We use the word "equal" in reference to trustworthiness or
untrustworthiness. "Is placed in opposition" we use instead of
the common expression "to conflict with," and we supply "as it
appears to me." When therefore one says, "It seems to me 203
that every statement which I have examined, which proves
something dogmatically, may have another statement placed in
opposition to it which also proves something dogmatically, and
which is equal to it in trustworthiness and untrustworthiness,"
this is not asserted dogmatically, but is an expression of human
feeling as it appears to the one who feels it. Some Sceptics 204
express the formula as follows: "Every statement should have an
equal one placed in opposition to it," demanding it
authoritatively thus: "Let us place in opposition to every
statement that proves something dogmatically another conflicting
statement which also seeks to prove something dogmatically, and
is equal to it in trustworthiness and untrustworthiness."
Naturally this is directed to the Sceptics, but the infinitive
should be used instead of the imperative, that is, "to oppose"
instead of "let us oppose." This formula is recommended to the 205
Sceptic, lest he should be deceived by the Dogmatists and
give up his investigations, and rashly fail of the [Greek:
ataraxia] which is thought to accompany [Greek: epoche] in
regard to everything, as we have explained above.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

_General Observations on the Formulae of the Sceptics._

We have treated of a sufficient num