ecause the anomaly is not of a kind to be
judged. For he who would pass judgment upon this is either in
some one of the conditions mentioned above, or is in absolutely
no condition whatever; but to say that he is in no condition at
all, as, for example, that he is neither in health nor in
illness, that he is neither moving nor quiet, that he is not of
any age, and also that he is free from the other conditions, is
wholly absurd. But if he judges the ideas while he is in any 113
condition whatever, he is a part of the contradiction, and,
besides, he is no genuine critic of external objects, because he
is confused by the condition in which he finds himself.
Therefore neither can the one who is awake compare the ideas of
those who are asleep with those who are awake, nor can he who is
in health compare the ideas of the sick with those of the well;
for we believe more in the things that are present, and
affecting us at present, than in the things not present. In 114
another way, the anomaly in such ideas is impossible to be
judged, for whoever prefers one idea to another, and one
condition to another, does this either without a criterion and a
proof, or with a criterion and a proof; but he can do this
neither without them, for he would then be untrustworthy, nor
with them; for if he judges ideas, he judges them wholly by a
criterion, and he will say that this criterion is either true or
false. But if it is false, he will be untrustworthy; if, on 115
the contrary, he says that it is true, he will say that the
criterion is true either without proof or with proof. If without
proof, he will be untrustworthy; if he says that it is true with
proof, it is certainly necessary that the proof be true, or he
will be untrustworthy. Now will he say that the proof which he
has accepted for the accrediting of the criterion is true,
having judged it, or without having judged it? If he says so 116
without judging it, he will be untrustworthy; if he has judged
it, it is evident that he will say that he has judged according
to some criterion, and we must seek a proof for this criterion,
and for that proof a criterion. For the proof always needs a
criterion to establish it, and the criterion needs a proof that
it may be shown to be true; and a proof can neither be sound
without a pre-existing criterion that is true, nor a criterion
true without a proof that is shown beforehand to be trustworthy.
And so both the crit
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