ernal objects. Thus we
arrive at [Greek: epoche] through the ten Tropes.
CHAPTER XV.
_The Five Tropes._
The later Sceptics, however, teach the following five Tropes 164
of [Greek: epoche]: first, the one based upon contradiction;
second, the _regressus in infinitum_; third, relation; fourth,
the hypothetical; fifth, the _circulus in probando_. The one 165
based upon contradiction is the one from which we find, that in
reference to the thing put before us for investigation, a
position has been developed which is impossible to be judged,
either practically, or theoretically, and therefore, as we are
not able to either accept or reject anything, we end in
suspending the judgment. The one based upon the _regressus 166
in infinitum_ is that in which we say that the proof brought
forward for the thing set before us calls for another proof, and
that one another, and so on to infinity, so that, not having
anything from which to begin the reasoning, the suspension of
judgment follows. The one based upon relation, as we have 167
said before, is that one in which the object appears of this
kind or that kind, as related to the judge and to the things
regarded together with it, but we suspend our judgment as to
what it is in reality. The one based upon hypothesis is 168
illustrated by the Dogmatics, when in the _regressus in
infinitum_ they begin from something that they do not found on
reason, but which they simply take for granted without proof.
The Trope, _circulus in probando_, arises when the thing 169
which ought to prove the thing sought for, needs to be sustained
by the thing sought for, and as we are unable to take the one
for the proof of the other, we suspend our judgment in regard to
both. Now we shall briefly show that it is possible to refer
every thing under investigation to one or another of these
Tropes, as follows: the thing before us is either sensible or
intellectual; difference of opinion exists, however, as to what
it is in itself, for some say that only the things of sense 170
are true, others, only those belonging to the understanding, and
others say that some things of sense, and some of thought, are
true. Now, will it be said that this difference of opinion can
be judged or cannot be judged? If it cannot be judged, then we
have the result necessarily of suspension of judgment, because
it is impossible to express opinion in regard to t
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