between true and false ideas, so such knowledge is
impossible. The Pyrrhonean denied that truth could exist in
ideas because of their contradictory nature, and consequently
the existence of all truth, [Greek: meden einai te aletheia epi
panton].[1] The Academic Sceptic granted that the truth was
possibly contained in ideas, but affirmed that it could never be
known to us. The Pyrrhoneans prided themselves on still being
seekers, for although ordinary ideas are too contradictory to
give knowledge of the outer world, they did not deny that such
knowledge might be possible, but simply suspended the judgment
regarding it. To the Pyrrhonean the result corresponded to the
method. All ideas thus far known revealed nothing of the truth,
therefore he still sought. The Academician tried logically to
prove that the truth is impossible to find. It is the relation
of the dialectician to the empiricist, and the two varieties of
Scepticism are explained by their difference in origin. In
Pyrrhonism there was no constructive element. In the Academic
Scepsis such an element was found throughout all its history in
the theory of Probability. Arcesilaus himself laid great stress
upon this doctrine, which Sextus carefully shows us[2] is
utterly inconsistent with Pyrrhonism. Arcesilaus plainly teaches
that, having suspended one's judgment in regard to matters of
knowledge, one should control his choices, his refusals, and his
actions by the probable.[3]

[1] Diog. IX. 11, 61.

[2] _Hyp._ I. 229.

[3] Compare Maccoll _Op. cit._ 39.

After Antiochus introduced Eclecticism into the Academy,
Pyrrhonism was the only representative of Greek Scepticism, and
it flourished for over two centuries after our era, and then
also disappeared, no more to exist as a regular philosophical
school.

Having considered at length the essence of Pyrrhonism as
presented by Sextus Empiricus, it now remains to briefly note
the characteristics that formed its strength and weakness, and
the causes of its final downfall. Herbart says that every
philosopher is a Sceptic in the beginning, but every Sceptic
remains always in the beginning. This remark may well be applied
to Pyrrhonism. We find in its teachings many fundamental
philosophical truths which might have formed the beginning of
great philosophical progress, but which were never developed to
any positive results. The teachings of Pyrrhonism were some of
them well fitted to prepare the way to i