nd now at length the trial
was to be made whether, in fair and open fight on land, Greece or Persia
would be superior. A suspicion of what the result would be might have
been derived from Marathon. But there the Persians had been taken at a
disadvantage, when the cavalry, their most important arm, was absent.
Here the error of Datis was not likely to be repeated. Mardonius had a
numerous and well-armed cavalry, which he handled with no little skill.
It remained to be seen, when the general engagement came, whether, with
both arms brought fully into play, the vanquished at Marathon would be
the victors.

The battle of Plataea was brought on under circumstances very
unfavorable to the Greeks. Want of water and a difficulty about
provisions had necessitated a night movement on their part. The
cowardice of all the small contingents, and the obstinacy of an
individual Spartan, disconcerted the whole plan of the operation, and
left the Lacedaemonians and the Athenians at daybreak separated from
each other, and deserted by the whole body of their allies. Mardonius
attacked at once, and prevented the junction of the two allies, so that
two distinct and separate engagements went on at the same time. In both
the Greeks were victorious. The Spartans repulsed the Persian horse and
foot, slew Mardonius and were the first to assail the Persian camp. The
Athenians defeated the _medizing_ Greeks, and effected a breach in
the defences of the camp, on which the Spartans had failed to make any
impression. A terrible carnage followed. The contingent of 40,000 troops
under Artabazus alone drew off in good order.

The remainder were seized with panic, and were either slaughtered like
sheep or fled in complete disarray. Seventy thousand Greeks not only
defeated but destroyed the army of 300,000 barbarians, which melted
away and disappeared making no further stand anywhere. The disaster of
Marathon was repeated on a larger scale, and without the resource of
an embarkation. Henceforth the immense superiority of Greek troops to
Persian was well known on both sides; and nothing but the distance from
Greece of her vital parts, and the quarrels of the Greek states among
themselves, preserved for nearly a century and a half the doomed empire
of Persia.

The immediate result of the defeats of Salamis and Platsea was a
contraction of the Persian boundary towards the west. Though a few
Persian garrisons maintained themselves for some years on the fu