few weeks later it was all-powerful in the Egean. But it was absent
exactly at the time when it was wanted. Alexander's passage and landing
were unopposed, and the Persians thus admitted within the Empire without
a struggle the enemy who was fated to destroy it.

When the Persian commanders heard that Alexander was in Asia, they
were anxious to give him battle. One alone, the Rhodian Greek, Memnon,
proposed and urged a wholly different plan of operations. Memnon advised
that a general engagement should be avoided, that the entire country
should be laid waste, and even the cities burnt, while the army
should retire, cut off stragglers, and seek to bring the enemy into
difficulties. At the same time he recommended that the fleet should be
brought up, a strong land force embarked on board it, and an effort made
to transfer the war into Europe. But Memnon's colleagues, the satraps
and commandants of the north-western portion of Asia Minor, could not
bring themselves to see that circumstances required a line of action
which they regarded as ignominious. It is not necessary to attribute to
them personal or selfish motives. They probably thought honestly that
they were a match for Alexander with the troops at their disposal, and
viewed retreat before an enemy numerically weaker than themselves as
a disgrace not to be endured unless its necessity was palpable.
Accordingly they determined to give the invader battle. Supposing that
Alexander, having crossed into Asia at Abydos, would proceed to attack
Dascyleium, the nearest satrapial capital, they took post on the
Granicus, and prepared to dispute the further advance of the Macedonian
army. They had collected a force of 20,000 cavalry of the best quality
that the Empire afforded, and nearly the same number of infantry,
who were chiefly, if not solely, Greek mercenaries. With these
they determined to defend the passage of the small stream above
mentioned--one of the many which flow from the northern flank of Ida
into the Propontis.

The battle thus offered was eagerly accepted by the Macedonian. If he
could not defeat with ease a Persian force not greatly exceeding his
own, he had miscalculated the relative goodness of the soldiers on
either side, and might as well desist from the expedition. Accordingly,
he no sooner came to the bank of the river, and saw the enemy drawn up
on the other side, than, rejecting the advice of Parmenio to wait till
the next day, he gave orders that