as a person to be dreaded, Darius
Codomannus renewed the preparations which he had discontinued, and
pushed them forward with all the speed that was possible. A fleet was
rapidly got ready: the satraps of Asia Minor were reinforced with troops
of good quality from the interior of the Empire, and were ordered to
raise a strong force of mercenaries; money was sent into Greece to the
Lacedaemonians and others in order to induce them to create disturbances
in Europe; above all, Memnon the Rhodian, a brother of Mentor, and a
commander of approved skill, was sent to the Hellespont, at the head of
a body of Greeks in Persian pay, with an authority co-ordinate to that
of the satraps.

A certain amount of success at first attended these measures. Memnon
was able to act on the offensive in North-Western Asia. He marched upon
Cyzicus and was within a little of surprising it, obtaining from the
lands and villas without the walls an immense booty. He forced Parmenio
to raise the seige of Pitane; and when Callas, one of the Macedonian
leaders, endeavored to improve the condition of things by meeting the
Persian forces in the open field, he suffered a defeat and was compelled
to throw himself into Rhoeteum.

These advantages, however, were detrimental rather than serviceable to
the Persian cause; since they encouraged the Persian satraps to regard
the Macedonians as an enemy no more formidable than the various tribes
of Greeks with whom they had now carried on war in Asia Minor for
considerably more than a century. The intended invasion of Alexander
seemed to them a matter of no great moment--to be classed with
expeditions like those of Thimbron and Agesilaus, not to need, as it
really did, to be placed in a category of its own. Accordingly, they
made no efforts to dispute the passage of the Hellespont, or to oppose
the landing of the expedition on the Asiatic shore. Alexander was
allowed to transport a force of 30,000 foot and 4000 or 5000 horse from
the Chersonese to Mysia without the slightest interference on the part
of the enemy, notwithstanding that his naval power was weak and that
of the Persians very considerable. This is one of those pieces of
remissness in the Persian conduct of military matters, whereof we have
already had to note signal instances, and which constantly caused the
failure of very elaborate and judicious preparations to meet a danger.
Great efforts had been made to collect and equip a numerous fleet, and
a