an the common casualties of war, was an
evidence of weakness which could not but become generally known, and of
which all could feel the force. Hence the retreat was as important as
the battle. If in late autumn and mid-winter a small Greek army, without
maps or guides, could make its way for a thousand miles through Asia,
and encounter no foe over whom it could not easily triumph, it was clear
that the fabric of Persian power was rotten, and would collapse on the
first serious attack.
Still, it will not be necessary to trace in detail the steps of the
retreat. It was the fact of the return, rather than the mode of its
accomplishment, which importantly affected the subsequent history of
Persia. We need only note that the retreat was successfully conducted in
spite, not merely of the military power of the Empire, but of the most
barefaced and cruel treachery--a fact which showed clearly the strong
desire that there was to hinder the invaders' escape. Persia did not
set much store by her honor at this period; but she would scarcely have
pledged her word and broken it, without the slightest shadow of excuse,
unless she had regarded the object to be accomplished as one of vast
importance, and seen no other way which offered any prospect of the
desired result. Her failure, despite the success of her treachery,
places her military weakness in the strongest possible light. The
Greeks, though deprived of their leaders, deceived, surprised, and
hemmed in by superior numbers, amid terrific mountains, precipices,
and snows, forced their way by sheer dogged perseverance through all
obstacles, and reached Trebizond with the loss of not one fourth of
their original number.
There was also another discovery made during the return which partly
indicated the weakness of the Persian power, and partly accounted for
it. The Greeks had believed that the whole vast space enclosed between
the Black Sea, Caucasus, Caspian, and Jaxartes on the one hand, and the
Arabian Desert, Persian Gulf, and Indian Ocean on the other, was bound
together into one single centralized monarchy, all the resources of
which were wielded by a single arm. They now found that even towards the
heart of the empire, on the confines of Media and Assyria, there existed
independent tribes which set the arms of Persia at defiance; while
towards the verge of the old dominion whole provinces, once certainly
held in subjection, had fallen away from the declining State, and
s
|