ays Napoleon, "it is probable that Nelson would have failed in
his attack; for it would have been impossible for him to pass between
the line and shore thus lined with cannon." As it was, the line was too
extended for strength, and its right too far advanced to receive
assistance from the battery of Amack. A part of the fleet remained as a
reserve, under Admiral Parker, while the others, under Nelson, advanced
to the King's Channel. This attacking force consisted of eight ships of
the line and thirty-six smaller vessels, carrying in all eleven hundred
guns, (without including those in the six gun-brigs, whose armament is
not given.) One of the seventy-four-gun ships could not be brought into
action, and two others grounded; but, Lord Nelson says, "although not in
the situation assigned them, yet they were so placed as to be of great
service." This force was concentrated upon _a part_ of the Danish line
of floating defences, the whole of which was not only inferior to it by
three hundred and eighty-two guns, but so situated as to be beyond the
reach of succor, and without a chance of escape. The result was what
might have been expected. Every vessel of the right and centre of this
outer Danish line was taken or destroyed, except one or two small ones,
which cut and run under protection of the fortifications. The left of
the line, being supported by the Crown-battery, remained unbroken. A
division of frigates, in hopes of providing an adequate substitute for
the ships intended to attack the batteries, ventured to engage them, but
"it suffered considerable loss, and, in spite of all its efforts, was
obliged to relinquish this enterprise, and sheer off."

[Footnote 21: Some writers say only sixty-eight or seventy; but the
English writers generally say eighty-eight. A few, (apparently to
increase the brilliancy of the victory,) make this number still
greater.]

The Danish vessels lying in the entrance of the channel which leads to
the city, were not attacked, and took no material part in the contest.
They are to be reckoned in the defence on the same grounds that the
British ships of the reserve should be included in the attacking force.
Nor was any use made of the guns on shore, for the enemy did not advance
far enough to be within their range.

The Crown-battery was _behind_ the Danish line, and mainly masked by it.
A part only of its guns could be used in support of the left of this
line, and in repelling the direct att