rles the Second,
has always considered it as her duty and interest to take her place in
such a confederacy. Her chief disputes must ever be with France; and if
England shows herself indifferent and unconcerned, when these powers are
combined against the enterprises of France, she is to look with
certainty for the same indifference on the part of these powers, when
she may be at war with that nation. This will tend totally to disconnect
this kingdom from the system of Europe, in which if she ought not rashly
to meddle, she ought never wholly to withdraw herself from it.
If, then, England is put in motion, whether by a consideration of the
general safety, or of the influence of France upon Spain, or by the
probable operations of this new system on the Netherlands, it must
embrace in its project the whole as much as possible, and the part it
takes ought to be as much as possible a leading and presiding part.
I therefore beg leave to suggest,--
First, That a minister should forthwith be sent to Spain, to encourage
that court to persevere in the measures they have adopted against
France,--to make a close alliance and guaranty of possessions, as
against France, with that power,--and, whilst the formality of the
treaty is pending, to assure them of our protection, postponing any
lesser disputes to another occasion.
Secondly, To assure the court of Vienna of our desire to enter into our
ancient connections with her, and to support her effectually in the war
which France has declared against her.
Thirdly, To animate the Swiss and the king of Sardinia to take a part,
as the latter once did on the principles of the Grand Alliance.
Fourthly, To put an end to our disputes with Russia, and mutually to
forget the past. I believe, if she is satisfied of this oblivion, she
will return to her old sentiments with regard to this court, and will
take a more forward part in this business than any other power.
Fifthly, If what has happened to the king of Prussia is only in
consequence of a sort of panic or of levity, and an indisposition to
persevere long in one design, the support and concurrence of Russia will
tend to steady him, and to give him resolution. If he be ill-disposed,
with that power on his back, and without one ally in Europe, I conceive
he will not be easily led to derange the plan.
Sixthly, To use the joint influence of our court, and of our then allied
powers, with Holland, to arm as fully as she can by sea,
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