nisters. I do not mean to penetrate into it.
My speculations on this head must be only conjectural. If the king of
Prussia, under the pretext or on the reality of some information
relative to ill practice on the part of the court of Vienna, takes
advantage of his being admitted into the heart of the Emperor's
dominions in the character of an ally, afterwards to join the common
enemy, and to enable France to seize the Netherlands, and to reduce and
humble the Empire, I cannot conceive, upon every principle, anything
more alarming for this country, separately, and as a part of the general
system. After all, we may be looking in vain in the regions of politics
for what is only the operation of temper and character upon accidental
circumstances. But I never knew accidents to decide the _whole_ of any
great business; and I never knew temper to act, but that some system of
politics agreeable to its peculiar spirit was blended with it,
strengthened it, and got strength from it. Therefore the politics can
hardly be put out of the question.

Great mistakes have been committed: at least I hope so. If there have
been none, the case in future is desperate. I have endeavored to point
out some of those which have occurred to me, and most of them very
early.

Whatever may be the cause of the present state of things, on a full and
mature view and comparison of the historical matter, of the transactions
that have passed before our eyes, and of the future prospect, I think I
am authorized to form an opinion without the least hesitation.

That there never was, nor is, nor ever will be, nor ever can be, the
least rational hope of making an impression on France by any Continental
powers, if England is not a part, is not the directing part, is not the
soul, of the whole confederacy against it.

This, so far as it is an anticipation of future, is grounded on the
whole tenor of former history. In speculation it is to be accounted for
on two plain principles.

First, That Great Britain is likely to take a more fair and equal part
in the alliance than the other powers, as having less of crossing
interest or perplexed discussion with any of them.

Secondly, Because France cannot have to deal with any of these
Continental sovereigns, without their feeling that nation, as a maritime
power, greatly superior to them all put together,--a force which is only
to be kept in check by England.

England, except during the eccentric aberration of Cha