by apprehending it."[754]
The good after which Aristotle would inquire is, therefore, a _relative
good_, since the knowledge of the absolute good can not possibly be
realized.
[Footnote 754: "Ethics," bk. i. ch. vi.]
Instead, therefore, of seeking to attain to "a transcendental and
absolute good "--a fundamental idea of right, which may be useful as a
paradigm by which we may judge of relative good, he addresses himself
solely to the question, "what is good for man"--what is the good
attainable in action? And having identified the Chief Good with the
final and perfect end of all action, the great question of the _Ethics_
is, "_What is the end of human action?_" (ti esti to ton prakton
teloa).[755]
[Footnote 755: "Ethics," bk. i. ch. xiii.]
Now an end or final cause implies an intelligence--implies a mind to
perceive and desire it. This is distinctly recognized by Aristotle. The
question, therefore, naturally arises--is that end fixed for man by a
higher intelligence, and does it exist for man both as an idea and as an
ideal? Can man, first, intellectually apprehend the idea, and then
consciously strive after its realization? Is it the duty of man to aim
at fulfilling the purposes of his Creator? To this it may be answered
that Aristotle is not at all explicit as to God's moral government of
the world. "Moral government," in the now common acceptation of the
term, has no place in the system of Aristotle, and the idea of "duty" is
scarcely recognized. He considers "the good" chiefly in relation to the
constitution and natural condition of man. "_It is_" says he, "_the end
towards which nature tends_." As physical things strive unconsciously
after the end of their existence, so man strives after the good
attainable in life. Socrates had identified virtue and knowledge, he had
taught that "virtue is a Science." Aristotle contended that virtue is an
art, like music and architecture, which must be attained by exercise. It
is not purely intellectual, it is the bloom of the physical, which has
become ethical. As the flower of the field, obeying the laws of its
organization, springs up, blooms, and attains its own peculiar
perfection, so there is an instinctive desire (orexis) in the soul which
at first unconsciously yearns after the good, and subsequently the good
is sought with full moral intent and insight. Aristotle assumes that the
desires or instincts of man are so framed as to imply the existence of
this end (tel
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