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n end to the fears of the mind, and to those which arise about the heavenly bodies [supernatural powers], and death and pain,... we should have no pretense for blaming those who wholly devote themselves to pleasure, and who never feel any pain, or grief (which is the chief evil) from any quarter."[773] Whilst, however, all pleasures of the body, as well as the mind, are equal in dignity, and alike good, they differ in intensity, in duration, and, especially, in their consequences. He therefore divides pleasure into two classes; and in this, as Cousin remarks, is found the only element of originality in his philosophy. These two kinds of pleasure are: 1. _The pleasure of movement, excitement, energy_ (edone en kinesei).[774] This is the most lively pleasure; it supposes the greatest development of physical and mental power. "Joy and cheerfulness are beheld in motion and energy." But it is not the most enduring pleasure, and it is not the most perfect. It is accompanied by uneasiness; it "brings with it many perturbations," and it yields some bitter fruits. [Footnote 773: "Fundamental Maxims," No. 9, in Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers," bk. x. ch. xxxi.] [Footnote 774: Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers," bk. x. ch. xxviii.] 2. _The second kind of pleasure is the pleasure of repose, tranquillity, impassibility_ (edone katastematike). This is a state, a "condition," rather than a motion. It is "the freedom of the body from pain, and the soul from confusion."[775] This is perfect and unmixed happiness--the happiness of God; and he who attains it "will be like a god among men." "The storm of the soul is at an end, and body and soul are perfected." Now, whilst "no pleasure is intrinsically bad,"[776] prudence (phronesis), or practical wisdom, would teach us to choose the highest and most perfect happiness. Morality is therefore the application of reason to the conduct of life, and virtue is wisdom. The office of reason is to "determine our choices"--to take account of the duration of pleasures, to estimate their consequences, and to regard the happiness of a whole lifetime, and not the enjoyment of a single hour. Without wisdom men will choose the momentary excitements of passion, and follow after agitating pleasures, which are succeeded by pain; they will consequently lose "tranquillity of mind." "It is not possible," says Epicurus, "to live pleasantly without living prudently and honorably
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