os).[756] And he asserts that man can only realize it in
the sphere of his own proper functions, and in accordance with the laws
of his own proper nature and its harmonious development.[757] It is not,
then, through instruction, or through the perfection of knowledge, that
man is to attain the good, but through exercise and habit (ephos). By
practice of moral acts we become virtuous, just as by practice of
building and of music, we become architects and musicians; for the
habit, which is the ground of moral character, is only a fruit of
oft-repeated moral acts. Hence it is by these three things--nature,
habit, reason--that men become good.

[Footnote 756: Ibid, bk. i. ch. ii.]

[Footnote 757: "Ethics," bk. i. ch. vii.]

Aristotle's question, therefore, is, _What is the chief good for man as
man_? not what is his chief good as a spiritual and an immortal being?
or what is his chief good as a being related to and dependent upon God?
And the conclusion at which he arrives is, that it is _the absolute
satisfaction of our whole nature_--that which men are agreed in calling
_happiness_. This happiness, however, is not mere sensual pleasure. The
brute shares this in common with man, therefore it can not constitute
the happiness of man. Human happiness must express the completeness of
rational existence. And inasmuch as intelligence is essential activity,
as the soul is the _entelechy_ of the body, therefore the happiness of
man can not consist in a mere passive condition. It must, therefore,
consist in _perfect activity_ in well-doing, and especially in
contemplative thought,[758] or as Aristotle defines it--"_It is a
perfect practical activity in a perfect life_."[759] His conception of
the chief good has thus two sides, one internal, that which exists in
and for the consciousness--a "complete and perfect life," the other
external and practical. The latter, however, is a means to the former.
That complete and perfect life is the complete satisfaction and
perfection of our rational nature. It is a state of peace which is the
crown of exertion. It is the realization of the divine in man, and
constitutes the absolute and all-sufficient happiness.[760] A good
action is thus an End-in-itself (teleion telos) inasmuch as it secures
the _perfection_ of our nature; it is that for the sake of which our
moral faculties before existed, hence bringing an inward pleasure and
satisfaction with it; something in which the mind can rest and