s to the whole system of things. The Theology of Aristotle is, in
fact, metaphysical rather than practical. He does not contemplate the
Deity as a moral Governor. Whilst Plato speaks of "being made like God
through becoming just and holy," Aristotle asserts that "all moral
virtues are totally unworthy of being ascribed to God."[753] He is not
the God of providence. He dwells alone, supremely indifferent to human
cares, and interests, and sorrows. He takes no cognizance of individual
men, and holds no intercourse with man. The God of Aristotle is not a
being that meets and satisfies the wants of the human heart, however
well it may meet the demands of the reason.
[Footnote 753: "Ethics," bk. x. ch. viii.]
Morality has no basis in the Divine nature, no eternal type in the
perfections and government of God, and no supports and aids from above.
The theology of Aristotle foreshadows the character of the
ARISTOTELIAN ETHICS.
We do not find in Aristotle any distinct recognition of an eternal and
immutable morality, an absolute right, which has its foundation in the
nature of God. Plato had taught that there was "an absolute Good, above
and beyond all existence in dignity and power;" which is, in fact, "the
cause of all existence and all knowledge," and which is God; that all
other things are good in proportion as they "partake of this absolute
Good;" and that all men are so far good as they "resemble God." But with
this position Aristotle joins issue. After stating the doctrine of Plato
in the following words--"Some have thought that, besides all these
manifold goods upon earth, there is some _absolute good_, which is the
cause to all these of their being good"--he proceeds to criticise that
idea, and concludes his argument by saying--"we must dismiss the idea at
present, for if there is any one good, universal and generic, or
transcendental and absolute, it obviously can never be realized nor
possessed by man; whereas something of this latter kind is what we are
inquiring after." He follows up these remarks by saying that "Perhaps
the knowledge of the idea may be regarded by some as useful, as a
pattern (paradeigma) by which to judge of relative good." Against this
he argues that "There is no trace of the arts making use of any such
conception; the cobbler, the carpenter, the physician, and the general,
all pursue their vocations without respect to the _absolute good_, nor
is it easy to see how they would be benefited
|