on is necessary to individual thought, but it is
perishable, and by its decay all memory, and therefore individuality, is
lost to the higher and immortal reason."[708]

This "Active or Creative Intellect" is again further subdivided, by
Aristotle--

1. The _Scientific_ (epistemonikon) part--the "virtue," faculty, or
"habit of principles." He also designates it as the "place of
principles," and further defines it as the power "which apprehends those
existences whose principles can not be otherwise than they are"--that
is, self-evident, immutable, and necessary truths[709]--the _intuitive
reason_.

2. The _Reasoning_ (logistikon) part--the power by which we draw
conclusions from premises, and "contemplate contingent matter"[710]--the
_discursive reason_.

The correlatives _noetic_ and _dianoetic_, says Hamilton, would afford
the best philosophic designation of these two faculties; the knowledge
attained by the former is an "intuitive principle"--a truth at first
hand; that obtained by the latter is a "demonstrative proposition"--a
truth at second hand.

The preceding notices of the psychology of Aristotle will aid us
materially in interpreting his remarks "_Upon the Method and Habits
necessary to the ascertainment of Principles_."[711]

[Footnote 708: "De Anima," bk. iii. ch. v.]

[Footnote 709: "Ethics," bk. vi. ch. i.]

[Footnote 710: Ibid.]

[Footnote 711: "Post. Analytic," bk. ii, ch. xix., the concluding
chapter of the Organon.]

"That it is impossible to have scientific knowledge through
demonstration without a knowledge of first immediate principles, has
been elucidated before." This being established, he proceeds to explain
how that "knowledge of first, immediate principles" is developed in the
mind.

1. The knowledge of first principles is attained by the _intuition of
sense_--the immediate perception of external objects, as the _exciting_
or _occasional cause_ of their development in the mind.

"Now there appears inherent in all animals an innate power called
_sensible perception_ (aisthesis); but sense being inherent, in some
animals a permanency of the sensible object is engendered, but in others
it is not engendered. Those, therefore, wherein the sensible object does
not remain have no knowledge without sensible perception, but others,
when they perceive, retain one certain thing in the soul,... with some,
_reason_ is produced from the permanency (of the sensible impression),
[as in man], but