the eidos, which produces actual health; the plan of the architect is
the conception, which produces an actual house. Here, however, a
distinction arises. In these artificial productions there is supposed a
noesis and a poiesis. The noesis is the previous conception which the
architect forms in his own mind; the poiesis is the actual creation of
the house out of the given matter. In this case the conception is the
moving cause of the production. The form of the statue in the mind of
the artist is the motive or cause of the movement by which the statue is
produced; and health must be in the thought of the physician before it
can become the moving cause of the healing art. Moreover, that which is
true of artificial production or change is also true of spontaneous
production. For example, a cure may take place by the application of
warmth, and this result is accomplished by means of friction. This
warmth in the body is either itself a portion of health, or something is
consequent upon it which is like itself, which is a portion of health.
Evidently this implies the previous presence either of nature or of an
artificer. It is also clearly evident that this kind of generating
influence (the automatic) should combine with another. There must be a
productive power, and there must be something out of which it is
produced. In this case, then, there will be a yle and an eidos.[723]
[Footnote 722: Ibid.]
[Footnote 723: Maurice's "Ancient Philosophy," pp. 205, 206.]
From the above it appears that the _efficient_ cause is regarded by
Aristotle as identical with the _formal_ cause. So also the _final_
cause--the end for the sake of which any thing exists--can hardly be
separated from the perfection of that thing, that is, from its
conception or form. The desire for the end gives the first impulse of
motion; thus the final cause of any thing becomes identical with the
good of that thing. "The moving cause of the house is the builder, but
the moving cause of the builder is the end to be attained--that is, the
house." From such examples as these it would seem that the
determinations of form and end are considered by Aristotle as one, in so
far as both are merged in the conception of _actuality_; for he regarded
the end of every thing to be its completed being--the perfect
realization of its idea or form. The only fundamental determinations,
therefore, which can not be wholly resolved into each other are _matter
and form_.[724]
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