ralities; and, on the other, that such and such cognitions
may or may not be thought, and are, therefore, as contingent, factitious
generalizations. To this process of experiment, analysis, and
classification, through which we attain to a scientific knowledge of
principles, it might be shown that Aristotle, not improperly, applies
the term _Induction_."--"Philosophy," p. 88.]
The human mind, he tells us, has two kinds of intelligence--the
_passive_ intelligence (nous pathetikos), which is the receptacle of
forms (dectikon tou eidous); and the _active_ intelligence (nous
poietikos), which impresses the seal of thought upon the data furnished
by experience, and combines them into the unity of a single judgment,
thus attaining "general notions."[688] The passive intelligence (the
"external perception" of modern psychology) perceives the individual
forms which appear in the external world, and the active intelligence
(the intellect proper) classifies and generalizes according to fixed
laws or principles inherent in itself; but of these fixed laws--prota
noemata--first thoughts, or _a priori_ ideas, he offers no proper
account; they are, at most, purely subjective. This, it would seem, was,
in effect, a return to the doctrine of Protagoras and his school, "that
man--the individual--is the measure of all things." The aspects under
which objects present themselves in consciousness, constitute our only
ground of knowledge; we have no direct, intuitive knowledge of Being _in
se_. The noetic faculty is simply a _regulative_ faculty; it furnishes
the laws under which we compare and judge, but it does not supply any
original elements of knowledge. Individual things are the only real
entities,[689] and "universals" have no separate existence apart from
individuals in which they inhere as attributes or properties. They are
consequently pure mental conceptions, which are fixed and recalled by
general names. He thus substitutes a species of conceptual-nominalism in
place of the realism of Plato. It is true that "real being" (to on) is
with Aristotle a subject of metaphysical inquiry, but the proper, if not
the only subsistence, or ouaia, is the form or abstract nature of
things. "The essence or very nature of a thing is inherent in the _form_
and _energy_"[690] The science of Metaphysics is strictly conversant
about these abstract intellectual forms just as Natural Philosophy is
conversant about external objects, of which the senses gi
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