ions between the two
countries, and eagerly spoke of his willingness to contribute by an
annual bounty to the establishment of a line of steamers.

After the Emperor's return to his dominions John Roach (a native of
Ireland, but long naturalized in the United States), an energetic
and capable ship-builder, of unusual foresight, energy, and integrity
of purpose, sent an agent to Rio Janeiro, and procured a contract
from the Brazilian Government pledging $125,000 per annum, provided
the Government of the United States would give the same amount, for
the establishment of a steam line between the two countries. Not
doubting the readiness of the American Government to respond, Mr.
Roach proceeded with full confidence, and built vessels for the line
in his own shipyard. The enterprise promised the best commercial
results; but to his chagrin and discomfiture, Mr. Roach found that no
amount of argument or appeal by those who were willing to speak for him
could induce Congress to contribute a single dollar for the
encouragement of the line. Brazil cancelled her offer when the United
States refused to join with her. Mr. Roach's ships were withdrawn,
and the line was surrendered to an inferior class of English steamers.

During the period of this futile experiment, as well as before and
afterwards, Congress annually appropriated more than a million dollars
for the maintenance of the South-American squadron of naval vessels,
to protect a commerce that did not exist, and for the creation of which
the United-States Government was unwilling to pay even ten per cent
of the cost annually of maintaining the squadron. Every intelligent
man knows that it is impossible to maintain a navy unless there be a
commercial marine for the education of sailors. The American marine
preceding 1861 was so large that it could furnish seventy-six thousand
sailors to maintain a blockading squadron on the South Atlantic and
Gulf coasts. The value of this school for seamen, as one of the arms
for National defense, could not have been more strikingly illustrated,
or more completely proved. The lesson should have been heeded. It is
a familiar adage requiring no enforcement of argument, that navies do
not grow at the top. They grow from and out of a commercial marine
that educates men for sea service. If the Government of the United
States had, since the close of the war, expended annually upon the
mercantile marine one-fifth of the amount that has